Everything you need to know about communications within the Delta Green organisation.

EMAIL COMMUNICATIONS
Email is the primary means of communications between agents and friendlies in Delta Green. When an agent needs to contact agents outside their cell, they send an email with the code name of that agent in the address of the message. The email is routed through multiple anonymous computer servers and automatically encrypted with PGP, which is currently unbreakable against known human methods (although this may soon change after recent advances in quantum computing). A PGP key is required to be kept on the computer involved, so all email communication is done over DELTA GREEN-enabled notebook computers that are rigged to efficiently destroy both the key and all records of email communication should the computer be compromised. The other danger is that the servers themselves will be physically compromised, so the locations of these servers are a closely- guarded secret of A-Cell and no one agent or friendly knows the locations of all the servers. This means that the system can still operate even if some of the servers are compromised.

PHONE COMMUNICATIONS
While email is used for most communications between cells, the telephone is still the most common means of intercell communication. Telephone communications are not as secure as Delta Green's email system, as they are more susceptible to surveillance devices. Still, telephone contact is more practical for coordinating operations and is sometimes the only contact possible in remote locations, where internet access is impossible but satellite phones like those used in the Globalstar.

Each Delta Green agent and friendly are issued at least one pre-paid phone card with unlimited calling time. These cards come in a variety of different brands like GetInTouch, WizardPhone, StepItService, and FullCall; but, in fact, all the cards are issued by a single company, Remote Data Incorporated. The cards are sold through non-franchise convenience stores to immigrant populations on the east and west coast of the United States. Remote Data deals with other companies to manufacture and distribute the cards, and they have no contact with these companies except by phone. Based in the Cayman Islands, Remote Data is outside the jurisdiction of American law enforcement, and its financial and ownership information is not available the public. All attempts to access the records of Remote Data are rebuffed with the utmost courtesy, and even if their offices were compromised in some way, the company keeps no records of its telephone transactions. To the outside world, Remote Data is simply another company dealing in the sale of pre-paid phone cards to immigrants, and that does account 99% of their business.

The other 1% are phone communications between Delta Green personnel. Along with their phone card, every agent and friendly are given a phone number for the primary contact in their cell and another number with which to contact A-Cell in an emergency. The primary contacts in each cell also have numbers for the primary contact of the cells above and below them (ie. Agent FRED has phone numbers for Agents ERNIE and GERTRUDE). Every individual has a different set of numbers, and they will only work when used with that individual's card(s).

Agents dial the 1-800 number of their card, type in the card's code number, type in a non-existent area code, and dial either the local number for communicating with friendlies or type the code name of the desired agent into the telephone keypad. The connection is then sent through an automated central telephone router where it is automatically encrypted and swept for most types of listening devices. Any irregularity results in the standard recorded error message that states the call cannot be completed as dialed. Records of the user's call only show the 1-800 number to Remote Data.

The telephone routers exist in a rented warehouse in New Jersey, owned and operated by a local organized crime family that has a vested interest in keeping the warehouse secure. Law enforcement has come close to raiding the location of the routers before due to criminal activity taking place there unrelated to Remote Data operations, but A-Cell's contacts in the FBI Organized Crime Task Force has consistently tipped them off and the routers have always been moved in time.

MAIL COMMUNICATIONS
While email and phone communications suffice for most situations, there are times physical data and evidence has to be shared between Delta Green cells. It should also be remembered that even satellite phones with global coverage still lack connection in certain regions like sub-Saharan Africa, the Arctic, and Antarctica. The mail is sometimes the only alternative.

The most common use for mail communications is the distribution of Green Box keys. The procedure is to inform the primary contact in a cell of the location of the Green Box through email or phone communications, and either FedEx them the key or leave the key in an airport or railway locker with a combination lock. This way, even if the mail is intercepted, it will still be difficult if not impossible to determine the location of the Green Box.

Files, evidence, and other physical information can also be distributed through the mail between cells, but this is extremely dangerous, as the mail can always be intercepted and the information lost. Whenever possible, such items are either delivered in person by a Delta Green agent acting as courier or left in a Green Box as a form of dead letter drop.

WEB COMMUNICATIONS
Delta Green has also set up a system to pass information over the web (here defined as WWW or FTP), but at the moment it is strictly used when other channels will not suffice. The system is mostly used to distribute advisories to all cell members. It is also sometimes used to invite a cell to a Night at the Opera, giving them directions where they can access more information on the case. Very rarely will the system be used to send files to agents and only in those situations where mail interception cannot be risked. Attempts have been made to scan tomes into electronic files and temporarily put them on a Delta Green web server for retrieval by approved agents, with middling results.

Most of the web servers hosting the Delta Green network used to be physically located in Scandinavia (Finland in particular), but due to recent crackdowns, the servers are now distributed worldwide. No one server is used for very long by Delta Green, and though the general access system remains in place, virtually all files located on the network are one-use, that is available to be downloaded only once, hopefully by the agent intended to retrieve the files. Even the indefinite advisories uploaded to a server are wiped clean after a month of use, which is usually when Delta Green moves the network to another server. All servers are completely destroyed after one year in service, to prevent any remnant of data from lingering. Most of the servers are either manned by Delta Green agents in computer security occupations (ie. NSA)or are members of Delta Green "Tiger Teams" (p.60, Delta Green) who routinely test the security of non-operational servers in the network (filled with dummy files) and the encryption of the files (none of the Tiger Teams has access to view the files themselves). So far, none of the "Tiger Teams" have been able to break the security of either the servers or the files, though they bear eternal hope.

Access to the Delta Green network is granted passively through newsgroup downloads made by the newsreader program on a DELTA GREEN-enabled notebook computer. On at least a weekly basis, the principal contact of a cell routinely downloads the headers of a newsgroup in the alt.binaries.pictures.erotica range based on the month in reverse alphabetical order (for example, a.b.p.e.lesbians for September, a.b.p.e.legs for October, a.b.p.e.latino for November, and so on). Any posts made by a user with initial DG (ie. Dan Greer, Darlene Gonzalez, etc.) are automatically retrieved by the newsreader and scanned for PGP-encrypted text stenographically inserted into the pornographic images (which are authentic). The PGP key is the same one used by the agent to read their email, so it is particular to them and can only be decrypted using their DG-enabled notebook computer. The text gives the address and password required to log onto the Delta Green network and retrieve whatever files are waiting for them. The passwords are almost always one-use, requiring the agent to download and decrypt another password for each access.

The DG-enabled notebook computer is not required to retrieve the stenographically-inserted text from the pornographic images and can be done from any newsgroup reader. The software on the DG-enabled computer does make the process easier and quicker, especially for the layman. It also does not require the user to actually view the pornographic images, a feature implemented after the complaints of several female Delta Green personnel. There are standing passwords on each DG-enabled notebook computer that are required to gain access to the Delta Green network, so actually accessing the network does require a DG-enabled computer. Each of these passwords is particular to every agent (or rather to each DG-enabled notebook computer assigned to that agent, as it is easy for another agent in a cell to take control of the computer if the principal contact agent is neutralized), so any attempt to access the Delta Green network from a non-DG-enabled computer initiates defensive countermeasures (see below), even if the network password is correct.

DELTA GREEN-Enabled Notebook Computer
Within each cell, the agent assigned as the primary contact is supplied with a DELTA GREEN-enabled notebook computer. These computers are regularly destroyed and replaced with a new model, so the computers remain current with recent technology and have the highest amounts of memory and processor speed available in consumer electronics. The latest model has two PCMCIA card slots, a DVD-ROM (to be replaced with DVD-RW when available), an internal modem, Ethernet card, a 100MB zip disk drive, and an IR port. The computers are supplied with two extra batteries. The computers are built on IBM, Dell, and Compaq chassis, but are ultimately similar in appearance and function.

Within the computer, there exists two hard drives and two BIOS chips. One hard drive is used to run Windows 98 (new models are being developed to run Windows XP), because the vast majority of Delta Green agents are only casual computer users and are most familiar with the Windows environment. The software package includes office, graphic, and antivirus programs, as well as whatever law enforcement software the agent may be privy to in their regular job.

The other drive runs what has come to be known as the Delta Green Operating System (DGOS), though there is no permanent documentation within the system that provides a name or references "Delta Green" in anyway. The only purpose of DGOS at this time is to provide a connection to the Delta Green Network (see Web Communications). This does not require a great deal of system resources, so very little is devoted to DGOS. FDISK reports the second hard drive as unformatted, which is useless if someone knows there is data on the disk but can avert attention during a cursory search.

To initiate DGOS, the user inserts a flash memory card into one of PCMCIA slots (the agent is encouraged to keep this card in a protective liner in their wallet). They then boot the second drive by hitting the CTRL-ALT command during startup, and be prompted with a password. Rather than a password, the user must type in at least six characters (any six characters) and hit Enter in the next five seconds or the computer will initiate the self-destruct sequence. This sequence will also be initiated if the computer is not shut down properly or the case is opened in any way.

The computer self-destructs through a powerful electromagnet with its own battery fitted over the DGOS hard drive. When security is compromised, the magnet is activated, wiping the DGOS hard drive. Older models had a thermite charge fitted to the DGOS hard drive until an incident where an agent was nearly compromised and indicted with terrorism during a routine airport security check. The Windows 98 drive, which is sealed from the magnet, continues to function properly even after security is compromised.

Besides its security system, the DGOS consists of an email program and web browser for maintaining DG communications. The peripheral devices (disk drives, IR port) will not function within DGOS, nor will any serial or parallel port connection besides the modem and Ethernet card. A record of all emails sent is transmitted automatically to Tiger Teams, who monitor email traffic from DG-enabled notebook computers to addresses outside the Delta Green network. A similar record of web browsing is also sent, so users cannot cut-&-paste material into web-based email like Yahoo or Hotmail without the Tiger Team alerting A-Cell about this. Agents are firmly instructed to limit their email and web browsing on DGOS to the Delta Green network.

Files downloaded from the Delta Green network are tagged as either save or read-only files. Files that can be saved are allowed to be stored on the hard drive, while read-only files remain on the flash memory card, which is wiped with the end of every DGOS session. This information is further protected through the use of TEMPEST standard components.


Much of the above information was taken from the Delta Green and Project Rainbow sourcebooks, as well as from discussions on the Delta Green Mailing List, in particular the posts of Bruce Harada, Edward Lipsett, Mark McFadden, and David Wienecke.